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The Fact/Opinion Distinction in Libel
by TIMOTHY W. GLEASON*
Introduction
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the United States Supreme
Court raised legal protection for statements of opinion2 to a
constitutional level.3 Justice Lewis Powell relied on the clas-
sic "marketplace of ideas ' 4 concept of the first amendment to
carve out constitutional protection:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact.5
As a result of Gertz, the accommodation of freedom of expres-
sion and protection of individual reputation in libel law "has
fundamentally changed."
However, "the promise of the Gertz dictum remains unful-
* Assistant Professor, School of Journalism, University of Oregon; B.A., SUNY
Empire State College, 1980; M.A., University of Washington, School of Communica-
tions, 1983; Ph.D., University of Washington, 1986.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. The legal literature lacks a satisfactory definition of opinion in the law of li-
bel. Generally, an opinion is defined as that which is not fact. See, e.g., Koch v.
Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1987) ("fs]tatements not themselves factual, and
which do not suggest that a conclusion is being drawn from facts not disclosed in the
statement are commonly statements of opinion"); See also Franklin, The Plaintiff's
Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 879
(1984) (some courts define opinions as nonverifiable statements).
3. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C.Cir. 1984) cert denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985). See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. And Beyond, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Note, Fact and Opinion
After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evaluation of a Privilege, 34 RuTGERs L. REv.
81 (1981).
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Holmes wrote that "the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." Id, This metaphor is dominant in twenti-
eth century free speech and press jurisprudence, but it has been criticized. See Ingber,
The Marketplace of Idea A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE LJ. 1 (1984).
5. Gert 418 U.S. at 339.
6. Oliman, 750 F.2d at 974.
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filled."7 Confusion continues over the distinction between pro-
tected statements of opinion and actionable statements of fact,
severely undercutting the constitutional protection of opinion.8
Lacking direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts
since Gertz have looked to existing common law and constitu-
tional criteria in attempting to fashion fact/opinion guidelines.
However, the common law distinction between statements of
unprotected fact and privileged opinion "primarily furnishes
vague familiar terms into which one can pour whatever mean-
ing is desired."9 Commentators have found the fact/opinion dis-
tinction in libel law to be little more than an ideal for judicial
decisionmaking.Y0 That is, judges recognize the obligation to
provide first amendment protection for opinion, but are left to
seek an elusive, and perhaps nonexistent, distinction."
Existing guidelines, developed to constrain and direct judicial
interpretation of ambiguous texts, are inadequate. 2 Current
guidelines employed by the courts include literary and social
context,3 imprecision of meaning and usage,' 4 terms of appar-
7. Introductory Remarks of Professor Paul A. LeBel at the conference of the
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Williamsburg,
Va. on Libel on the Editorial Pages (Nov. 6-7, 1987).
8. A Connecticut trial court judge recently commented on the confusion sur-
rounding the fact/opinion distinction: "The Supreme Court in Gertz furnished no
guidelines for making this determination and courts have gone in all directions. Some
courts have held it to be a judgment call, others have selected a single determinative
factor, and still others have adopted a multi-factor test." Dow v. New Haven Indep.,
14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1652, 1655 (Conn. 1987).
9. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute
in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (1962).
10. Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1949); Titus, supra note 9,
at 1205-06; Schauer, Language, Truth and the First Amendment An Essay in Memory
of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 301 (1978).
11. Professor Wigmore asserts that "no such distinction is scientifically possible."
9 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1919, at 14-15 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981), quoted in
Franklin, supra note 2, at 870. For example, "liar" was held to be a statement of fact
in Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 895 (2d Cir. 1976), but a statement of opinion in
Edwards v. Nat'l. Audubon Soc'y., 556 F.2d. 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1977).
12. Professor Wilbur Schramm's description of communication captures the
meaning of communication as the term is used in this article:
Society is a sum of relationships in which information of some kind is
shared.... Human communication is something people do .... When we study
communication, therefore, we study people - relating to one another and to
their groups, organizations, and societies; influencing one another; being in-
fluenced; informing and being informed; teaching and being taught; enter-
taining and being entertained. To understand human communication we
must understand how people relate to one another.
2 W. SCHRAMM & W. E. PORTER, MEN, WOMEN, MESSAGES AND MEDIA 3 (1982).
13. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979; see infra text accompanying notes 100-102.
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ency,'5 and "verifiability.1 l However, focusing on the meaning
of texts ignores the role audiences play in giving meaning to
texts. The unpredictability of audience interpretation - the
same word may hold very different meanings for different seg-
ments of an audience - raises serious concerns about the abil-
ity of judges to determine consistently whether ambiguous
texts are fact or opinion.
The law of libel is based upon judicial assumptions about
communication. 7 If statements were viewed from a communi-
cation standpoint, the distinction between fact and opinion
would be more clear. While it is unrealistic to expect judges to
adopt the methods of communication research, an interdiscipli-
nary approach" to the fact/opinion dichotomy provides insights
into the recurring problems of defamation law. This article
first examines the fact/opinion distinction from a communica-
tions perspective. Then, it explores the legal approach to fact/
opinion problems, including the common law defense of fair
comment and constitutional developments prior to Gertz. Fi-
nally, it examines recent judicial efforts to formulate tests for
distinguishing fact from opinion.
I
A Communication Perspective
Opinion is generally defined as an evaluative statement:
"[e]vidence of what the witness thinks, believes, or infers in re-
gard to facts... as distinguished from his personal knowledge
14. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979; see infra text accompanying notes 97-98. See also
Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d at 893; see infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
15. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784
(9th Cir. 1980); see infra text accompanying note 193.
16. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979; see infra text accompanying note 99. See also Jan-
klow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1986); see infra text accompanying
note 182.
17. Cohen, Libel as Communication Phenomena, 9 Comm. & LAw 9 (1987).
18. Professor Wallace D. Loh observed:
Social scientists are trained in the scientific method. They are socialized to
think in terms of generating and testing theories. Lawyers are trained in the
dialectical method. They are skilled in working with precedents and analogy
in light of principles and policies in order to arrive at authoritative settle-
ments of disputes.... Thus, it is a natural tendency to frame problems in
ways that require for their analysis those methods and concepts with which
one is most familiar. A trained incapacity to view things the way another
discipline sees them is inevitable, yet to overcome it is necessary to interdisci-
plinary endeavor.
W. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS vii (1984).
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of the facts."' 9 Facts are defined as verifiable statements based
on positive knowledge: "[a]n actual and absolute reality, as dis-
tinguished from mere supposition or opinion."'
At either extreme, the fact/opinion distinction is not prob-
lematic. Judge Lois G. Forer suggests that the law adopt E. B.
White's definition of fact:
Use this word only of matters capable of verification, not
matters of judgment. That a particular event happened on a
given date, that lead melts at a certain temperature are facts.
But such conclusions as that Napoleon was the greatest of
modern generals or that the climate of California is delightful,
however defensible they may be, are not properly called
facts.2'
But in the wide middle ground of language, where the same
word can have multiple meanings, a given word or phrase may
be either fact or opinion depending upon the audience's
interpretation. 2
A. The Linear Model of Communication
The current legal fact/opinion distinction is grounded in a
message-focused linear model of communication, long aban-
doned as inadequate by communication researchers.23
The linear model reduces communication to a simple trans-
mission of information from a speaker to a receiver. The
speaker sends a message which has an inherent, fixed meaning.
The receiver, a relatively passive receptacle, responds to the
message but the choice of responses is determined by mes-
sage content. Thus, the possible effects of the message on the
receiver are limited: it is assumed that the audience interpreted
the message as the speaker intended.24
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (5th ed. 1979).
20. Id
21. L. G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT 267-68 (1987) (quoting E. B. White).
22. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 306-11 (1980).
23. Haskins, Patzke & Price, Freedom of Speech. A Review Based Upon Analyti-
cal Communication Models, 8 CoMM. & LAW 37-44 (June 1986). See also Cohen, supra
note 18, at 10.
24. S. LOWERY, M. L. DEFLEUR, MILESTONES IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
23 (1983). Professors Lowery and DeFleur summarize this theory of "uniform influ-
ences" as follows:
1. The media present messages to the members of the mass society who per-
ceive them more or less uniformly. 2. Such messages are stimuli that influ-
ence the individual's emotions and sentiments strongly. 3. The stimuli lead
[Vol. 10:763
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This "bullet" or "hypodermic needle"25 theory of communi-
cation places great emphasis on the speaker and on inherent
message content. It assumes that the meaning and effect of
language can be predicted by examining two interdependent
variables: (1) the intent of the speaker; and (2) the content of
the speaker's message. The audience's response to messages is
assumed to be rational and attentive.
By focusing on the speaker and the message, courts have cre-
ated a body of law which allows for prediction of the effect of
messages on the audience. In libel, the effect of the speech,
(that is, the damage to reputation caused by a speaker's state-
ment) can be predicted by evaluating the speaker's intent and
the inherent content of the message. If message content is po-
tentially defamatory, then it is assumed that it has a negative
effect on reputation.
The widely accepted common law rule that allegations of
criminal conduct are libelous per se is a good example of the
use of a linear communication model.26 For example, if a tele-
vision news reporter states that "a jury in Anytown found the
former president of the First National Bank, Mr. Frank Jones,
37, of 407 Main Street, guilty of embezzling bank funds," the
presumed effect is that Mr. Jones' reputation has been harmed.
The effect of the communication can be predicted by examining
the content of the message. Since the message contains factual
information generally agreed to be defamatory within the con-
text of a news report, the effect on the audience is presumed.
The linear model dictates one response to the message: we
respect Mr. Jones less since a jury found that Mr. Jones vio-
lated the law. However, communication research shows that
message content alone does not provide enough information for
predicting audience response.
B. The Transactional Model of Communication
The transactional model of communication treats communi-
individuals to respond in a somewhat uniform manner, creating changes in
thought and action that are like those changes in other persons. 4. Because
individuals are not held back by strong social controls from others, such as
shared customs and traditions, the effects of mass communication are power-
ful, uniform and direct.
I See also Haskins, Patzke & Price, supra note 21, at 38.
25. D. PEMBER, 5 MASS MEDIA IN AMERICA 321 (1985).
26. See, e.g., Worley v. Oregon Physicians Service, 69 Or. App. 241, 686 P.2d 404
(1984).
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cation as a process in which individuals interact simultane-
ously.Y When communication is viewed as an interactive
process, the ability to predict the effect of a specific message is
dependent upon a long list of variables. The complexity of au-
dience interpretations of the same message challenges the lin-
ear-based assumptions in the law of libel.
Returning to the earlier example, suppose a television station
erroneously reported the following. "A jury in Anytown found
the former president of the First National Bank, Mr. Frank
Jones, 37, of 407 Main Street, guilty of embezzling bank funds."
In the transactional model, numerous factors can reduce the
defamatory effect of the statement. The following questions
might be raised:
First, what percentage of the viewing audience paid attention
to the report? Communication research tells us that publishing
or broadcasting a report does not guarantee that a significant
percentage of the audience paid attention to or formed an opin-
ion about the report's topic. For example, when Judge Robert
Bork was nominated to the United States Supreme, Court, a
majority of Americans knew very little about his controversial
views and the views of those who had vehemently opposed him.
A CBS/New York Times poll found that sixty-six percent of
the American public "could not say" whether they favored
Judge Bork's nomination when the hearings began. 8
Second, of those who paid attention to the report, what per-
centage will be able to recall the specific information? Empiri-
cal studies of television news audiences indicate that much of
the audience cannot recall the specifics of more than one or two
stories from any given newscast. 9
Third, was a large percentage of the audience predisposed to
think either negatively or positively about Mr. Jones? Prior
knowledge and an individual's strongly held views on a topic
have an important influence on audience interpretation of in-
formation. If the audience is sympathetic to Mr. Jones, the re-
port of his conviction may not reflect negatively on his
reputation. 0
Fourth, what is the credibility of the newscaster who re-
27. Haskins, Patzke & Price, supra note 23, at 39; Lowery, supra note 24, at 24-25.
28. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1987, at 27, col. 1.
29. J. P. ROBINSON & M. LEVY, THE MAIN SOURCE 109 (1986).
30. McCroskey, The Fffects of Evidence As An Inhibitor Of Counter-Persuasion,
37 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 194 (1970).
(Vol. 10:763
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ported the conviction? Source credibility is a major factor in
audience interpretation. If the audience does not believe or
does not like the messenger, the message may not have the pre-
sumed effect.31
Fifth, and most important, what was the context of the state-
ment? The presumed audience response is likely to be inaccu-
rate if the setting in which the statement was made is not
considered. If a statement was made in the context of the edi-
torial page of the newspaper,32 or a heated political debate,3 3 it
could be mistakenly characterized as fact instead of opinion.
Applying the foregoing, assume that Mr. Jones is a very pop-
ular well-known figure in Anytown. In recent years he has
championed a number of popular political causes and has
served as a part-time city councilman as well as a bank presi-
dent. However, Mr. Jones faces financial and psychological
ruin. He made a series of bad investments, and a fire burned
down his underinsured house, killing his wife and two children.
Because of his position in the community, Mr. Jones' troubles
have been widely reported by the local television station. The
station manager endorsed Mr. Jones' opponent in the past city
council elections, and the newscaster who reported Mr. Jones'
troubles made off-the-cuff remarks at Mr. Jones' expense.
It is arguable that many members of the audience would not
think less of Mr. Jones as a result of the report. To the con-
trary, many members of the audience might respond emotion-
ally to the plight of Mr. Jones and feel sympathy for him.
Some members of the audience might not like or believe the
newscaster and therefore would dismiss the information. A
large portion of the audience might not pay any attention to the
report because they do not know Mr. Jones and do not bank at
First National, or because the report appeared after the
weather forecast and the sports report. Yet another segment of
the audience might take note of it but not change its opinion of
Mr. Jones. Another segment might pay attention to the report,
but the next day be unable to remember the name of the "guy
who embezzled the money from the bank." While a newscast
generally contains factual statements, the foregoing factors
31. Andreoli & Worchel, Fffects of Media, Communicator, and Message Position
on Attitude Change, 42 PuB. OPINION Q. 69 (1978).
32. See injfra notes 92-109 and accompanying text (discussion of Oilman).
33. See infvra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussion of Commonwealth v.
Canter, 269 Mass. 359, 168 N.E. 790 (1929)).
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challenge this linear-based assumption of harm to Mr. Jones'
reputation.
A transactional model of communication opens the door to a
variety of potential effects - as numerous as there are mem-
bers of an audience. Audiences are not passive recipients of
fixed messages; rather, they are individuals who construct
meaning within their own cognitive, emotional, and social
frameworks. Unlike the linear model, the transactional com-
munication model highlights the central role of the audience in
interpreting texts. The transactional model challenges the va-
lidity of fixed categories of defamatory and non-defamatory
speech based solely on analysis of speakers' intent or message
content.
C. The Jury Model of Audience Behavior
Audience behavior would seem highly unpredictable, yet one
theory finds audience behavior consistent: the jury model.
Under a jury model of audience behavior and composition, the
audience - a representative group of individuals without
strong biases - reaches a conclusion about the validity of a
given opinion by examining the relationship of the speaker's
factual assertions to the speaker's conclusions. This model as-
sumes that the audience (1) is receptive to well-constructed ra-
tional arguments; (2) attempts to establish the factual truth of a
given statement and bases its conclusion on the facts presented
in support of the speaker's opinion; (3) listens impartially to
both sides and lacks any predisposition to a particular conclu-
sion; and (4) pays attention to the argument presented and re-
flects on the statements only through memory. 4
While the jury model has some validity within the context of
the controlled environment of a courtroom,35 it has little in
common with audience interpretation of messages outside the
courtroom. Certainly some members of a given audience will fit
the profile of the model juror, but communication research
shows that the jury model identifies only one of many possible
audience responses to a well-constructed, rational argument.3
34. This is an idealized view of the workings of the jury system. 5 H. ABRAHAM,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 111-37 (1986).
35. A growing body of communication and law literature suggests that the jury
model is less than valid even in the courtroom. See, e.g. R. HASTIE, INSIDE THE JURY
(1983); H. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 133-35.
36. See Sternthal, The Persuasive Effect of Source Credibility, 42 PUB. OPINION Q.
[Vol. 10:763
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D. Judicial Interpretation of Ambiguous Texts
Even if a rational audience response could be predicted,
judges would still be confronted with the threshold question
of interpreting ambiguous texts. As a matter of law, the judge
determines whether a text is a statement of opinion or of fact.37
Verifiability is often the key inquiry, as a statement of fact is
said to be one that can be proved either true or false.-"
Judicial categorization of words, phrases, and images is a pro-
cess of interpreting the texts. While general agreement will
exist in many instances, ambiguous cases raise serious con-
cerns. Recent cases demonstrate that different judges reading
the same words published in similar contexts have reached con-
flicting interpretations of the nature of the word."9
It is not surprising that judicial interpretation of text in fact/
opinion cases frequently consists of assertions of certainty
about the fact or opinion status of a given text.40 The status of
the text is clear to that judge. However, another judge or other
members of the audience may reach different conclusions.
II
The Legal Approach
A. The Fact/Opinion Distinction in the Common Law
of Fair Comment
The defense of fair comment protects "honest expressions of
294 (1978) (the use of evidence did not increase the persuasiveness of a highly credible
source, but it considerably enhanced the influence of a low credibility source provided
that the evidence was unfamiliar to the audience); Sanders, Style, Meaning, and
Message Effects, 51 CoMM. MONOGRAPHS 154 (1984) (communication success and fail-
ure often depend not merely on the content of a message but as much or more on how
one expresses and delivers It).
37. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700
F.2d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir. 1983); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.
1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
38. Franklin, supra note 2, at 873.
39. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. For an accessible introduction to
the ongoing dialogue about the interpretation of texts, see S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT
IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
40. E.g., Action Repair, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 776 F.2d. 143 (7th
Cir. 1985); Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d. 1191 (1984);
O'Donnell v. Field Enters., 145 Ill. App. 3d 292, 491 N.E.2d 1212 (1986); Miskovsky v.
Oklahoma Publishing, Co., 654 P.2d. 587, cert denied, 459 U.S. 923, reh t denied, 459
U.S. 1059 (1982); Walker v. Southeastern Newspapers, 9 Media L Rep. (BNA) 1516
(Oct. 20, 1982).
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opinion on matters of legitimate public interest where based
upon a true or privileged statement of fact.' '41 While the de-
fense is well established in the common law, it is nevertheless
"ill defined. ' '4
Much of the confusion surrounding the common law of fair
comment can be found in the judicial analysis of the fact/opin-
ion distinction. Until recent years, little attention was paid to
the confusing and mechanistic analysis used to distinguish fact
from opinion.4
The first Restatement of Torts accurately stated the common
law approach toward fair comment. Comment was defined as
"an expression of the opinion of the commentator or critic upon
the facts commented on or criticized." 44 The distinction of fact
from opinion was central to the fair comment defense, yet the
Restatement provided little guidance for distinguishing the two
categories of expression. It defined statements of fact as lan-
guage "reasonably capable of being understood as constituting a
charge of a specific act or omission. '45 If the language in ques-
tion qualified as a statement of fact, then the truth or falsity of
the charge was susceptible to proof. A statement not capable of
objective proof was thus a statement of opinion. However,
statements in the form of an expression of opinion could be in-
terpreted as statements of fact if no factual basis for evaluating
the opinion statements was known or stated.46
Commonwealth v. Canter47 is an extreme example of the in-
adequacy of the common law approach. A criminal libel action
was brought against Harry Canter, the leader of a group pro-
testing the execution of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the
words "Fuller - Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti," referring to
the governor of the state, constituted a defamatory statement
of fact: "the words... taken in their usual, natural and popular
41. Titus, supra note 9, at 1203 (quoting 4 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 456 (1956); Franklin, supra note 2, at 872.
42. Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1949).
43. Titus, supra note 9, at 1205, 1211. In 1962, Professor Titus wrote that "only
one piece of legal writing has attempted to analyze what is meant by the distinction
between these two kinds of statements: A student note in 62 HARVARD LAW REVIEW."
Id at 1211. Professor Titus summarized the criticism of the somewhat nebulous fact/
opinion distinction in the common law. Id at 1211-22.
44. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comment b (1938).
45. Id § 565 comment b.
46. Id § 567 comments a & b.
47. 269 Mass. 359, 168 N.E. 790 (1929); see also Schauer, supra note 10, at 263-68.
[Vol. 10:763
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sense and without forced construction, import a charge of the
most heinous crime known to the law - willful murder.""
The court followed the common law rule that an accusation
of criminal activity is libelous per se.49 The court failed to take
into account the context of the message, a protest rally over a
politically controversial execution. The court did not read the
placard for what it was - an emotional, political statement of
opinion.
A New York case, Cohalan v. New York World-Telegram
Corp.,50 also illustrates the inadequacy of the fact/opinion dis-
tinction in the common law:
To write of a man that he is "a disgrace to human nature" is a
defamatory allegation of fact. But if the words were, "He mur-
dered his father, and therefore is a disgrace to human nature,"
the latter words appear from the context to be merely a com-
ment on the fact.5 '
Thus, the judiciary failed to resolve the uncertain and arbi-
trary distinction of fact from opinion under the common law.
B. Constitutional Protection Before Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In the years following New York Times v. Sullivan,5 when
the courts began to examine the constitutional protection of
opinion statements, the long-recognized problems53 with the
common law moved into the constitutional arena. Two related
questions were raised: First, within a specific context, what is
the meaning of the text? Second, how will (or should) the audi-
ence interpret the text?
While courts began to recognize the importance of contextual
factors in interpreting texts after Sullivan, the fact/opinion
48. Canter, 269 Mass. at 371, 168 N.E. at 790.
49. See, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 567 comment a.
50. 172 Misc. 1061, 16 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1939).
51. 1d at 1064, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 710, (quoting GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 373
(3d ed. 1938)).
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Particularly pertinent was the Court's statement that
"since the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege
for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be
afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, state-
ments of fact." Id. at 292 n.30. See also Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilee, 34 RUTGERS L REv. 81, 91-92 (1981) (discus-
sion of footnote 30).
53. The distinction between fact and opinion has "proved to be a most unsatisfac-
tory and unreliable one, difficult to draw in practice." 4 W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 820 (4th ed. 1971).
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distinction in libel law continues to reflect unexamined as-
sumptions about the nature of language and audiences'
responses.
In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v.
Bresler,5 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the word "black-
mail" was protected opinion.'s In the context of a heated de-
bate over a government land use planning issue, "blackmail"
was "rhetorical hyperbole," not an assertion of fact:
[In this context, it was] simply impossible to believe that a
reader who reached the word "blackmail" ... would not have
understood exactly what was meant:... No reader could have
thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the news-
paper articles reporting their words were charging Bresler
with the commission of a criminal offense. On the contrary,
even the most careless reader must have perceived that the
word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous
epithet used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating po-
sition extremely unreasonable. 56
The U.S. Supreme Court reinforced the role of context in in-
terpreting language in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin.57 During a postal
workers' strike, a union newsletter contained a "List of Scabs"
and Jack London's definition of a scab:
The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children,
and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his
employer.
Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God;
Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a trai-
tor to his God, his country, his family, and his class.'
Justice Marshall noted the volatile climate of labor disputes
and asserted that the audience expected to hear opinion-laden
statements in such a climate.59
Greenbelt and Letter Carriers established context as a pri-
mary criterion for the interpretation of language. Courts must
examine language within its context; that is, the court must
take into account the expectations of the audience within a
given social or political situation.
54. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
55. Id at 13.
56. Id at 14 (footnote omitted).
57. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
58. Id at 267-68.
59. 1& at 272.
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However, Letter Carriers also confused the analysis. Rather
than relying on context as a determinative factor, Letter Carri-
ers also utilized a text-based analysis. The Court stated that
"traitor" was used "in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate
the union's strong disagreement with the views of those work-
ers who oppose unionization."'
Did the speaker intend for the audience to interpret "traitor"
loosely or did the context in which the speaker used the term
establish the figurative use? Letter Carriers recognized the
role of context and its influence on audience interpretation, but
at the same time it introduced a second, text-based guideline
that diminishes the importance of context.
C. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
On the same day the Court ruled in Letter Carriers it also
handed down its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.6 1 Jus-
tice Powell's assertion of absolute constitutional protection for
ideas or opinions6 2 - and the constitutional requirement that
judges pay attention to the context in which language is used -
has become a powerful precedent for expanding the types of
expression protected under the category of opinion. Federal
and state courts have thus held that the Constitution requires
absolute protection for statements of "pure opinion. "63
D. Post-Gertz: The Restatement Approach Redefined
In 1977, the American Law Institute incorporated the Gertz
dicta into the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Pure opinion, as
defined in the Restatement, exists when a statement does not
"impl[y] the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the
basis for the opinion.' 'a5 This definition of pure opinion contin-
ues the relation between facts and opinion found in the com-
mon law:
The simple expression of opinion, or the pure type, occurs
when the maker of the comment states the facts on which he
bases his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses a comment
60. Id. at 284.
61. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
62. Justice Powell used "ideas" and "opinions" interchangeably. Id at 339.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comments b & c (1977).
64. See Christie, Defamatory Opinions and The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75
MicH. L. REv. 1621, 1642 (1977).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566. Note that the fair comment privi-
lege had been applied to expressions of pure opinion. Id. comment b.
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as to the plaintiff's conduct, qualifications or character ....
The pure type of expression of opinion may also occur when...
both parties to the communication know the facts or assume
their existence and the comment is clearly based on those as-
sumed facts and does not imply the existence of other facts in
order to justify the comment."
The Restatement contrasts protected pure opinion with
"mixed" opinion: A statement, "while an opinion in form or
context, is apparently based on facts regarding the plaintiff or
his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or as-
sumed to exist by the parties to the communication." '6 7 A
mixed opinion statement is not protected by the Constitution
because "it may reasonably be understood to imply the asser-
tion of undisclosed [defamatory] facts that justify the expressed
opinion about the plaintiff or his conduct.""
The Restatement approach retains the common law assump-
tion that audiences use a rational method of interpretation and
evaluate opinion statements based on internal consistency and
logic. In light of this assumption about audience behavior, the
Restatement creates two categories of protected opinion: (1) the
common law fair comment defense where the facts supporting
the opinion are either stated or known; and (2) hyperbolic or
overblown statements where the audience would not assume
that the opinion is based on unknown facts. The Restatement
categories have played a major role in shaping the development
of constitutional protection for opinion,69 but they do not clarify
the uncertainty and vagueness of the fact/opinion distinction.
III
Case Law Since Gertz
The fact/opinion distinction since Gertz has wavered between
two extremes. At one end, context is the determinative crite-
rion: If the audience would expect opinions in such a context,
then statements are protected. At the other end, the message
content of the speech determines whether it is fact or opinion.
As will be seen, most courts fall somewhere between these two
extremes, acknowledging context but placing great weight on
66. 1&
67. 1l
68. Id. comment c.
69. R. Trager & W. Chamberlain, The Dangerous Exception To Protection For
Opinion. (Aug. 1987) (paper delivered to Law Division, AEJMC).
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content. The result are fact/opinion guidelines which address
both message content and context without clearly weighing
either. These guidelines do not provide predictable, consistant
interpretations of texts.
A. State Courts
In Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,7" the California
Supreme Court favored a context approach, holding that the
first amendment required language to be interpreted "in light
of the nature and content of the communication taken as a
whole."71 In examining statements challenging the motives of
union officers involved in negotiations, the court found that
within the context of a labor dispute, "charges... of the kind
typically generated in the 'economic give-and-take' of a spirited
labor dispute"7 2 which were "cautiously phrased in terms of ap-
parency"73 constituted protected opinion.
Like California, Massachusetts has favored the context ap-
proach. In National Association of Government Employees,
Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp.,74 the court held that a town
official's statement on a local radio talk show was protected
opinion. The official said that the actions of the police union
during police contract negotiations constituted an "inroad of
communism.'' 7 The court said that the plaintiff's claim that
this was a defamatory statement of fact "becomes threadbare
when setting and meaning are.., explored. '76
In Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co.,77 Massachusetts again
favored the context approach. In June of 1983, Ellen Goodman,
a nationally syndicated columnist for the Boston Globe, wrote
an editorial column full of outrage over the verdict in the trial
of the "Holbrook Five. '78 They were charged with the rape of a
thirty-nine year old woman and for malicious damage to her
car."' Goodman expressed her anger over the inherent injus-
tice *he found in a legal system that reached a not guilty verdict
70. 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976).
71. Id. at 601, 552 P.2d at 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
72. Id. at 603, 552 P.2d at 429, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
73. I&
74. 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d. 996 (1979).
75. 1l at 225, 396 N.E.2d at 1001.
76. Id
77. 398 Mass. 731, 500 N.E.2d 794 (1986).
78. Id. at 733, 500 N.E.2d at 796.
79. Id, 500 N.E.2d at 796-97.
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on the rape charge but convicted on the charge of malicious
damage.80
What is agreed upon by everyone is that the men took turns.
While one was jumping her, the others were jumping on her
car. At the end, the bruised auto was rolled over the embank-
ment. The bruised woman was left naked in the January
night.
On June 17, they were found innocent of damaging the wo-
man but - hosanna and pass the scales of justice - guilty of
damaging the car."'
Alexander Aldoupolis, one of the "Holbrook Five," brought a
libel action against Goodman and the Globe. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court used the Ninth Circuit's guide-
lines8 2 to find that the statement was constitutionally protected
opinion." In reaching this conclusion, the court engaged in
rather sophisticated literary criticism. The statement was an
opinion statement because of:
Eviden[ce] from the comparison of an automobile and a woman
which Goodman makes throughout the column. She uses the
rhetorical device of personification to make an automobile a
person and by an adroit cadence of parallel sentences compares
the favorable treatment of a motor vehicle to the shabby treat-
ment of women in rape cases."
In Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.,5 the New York
Court of Appeals favored the content approach. The case in-
volved an article by Jack Newfield, a highly controversial in-
vestigative reporter for the Village Voice. The article, "The
Ten Worst Judges in New York," was reprinted in Cruel and
Unusual Justice, a collection of Newfield's stories from the Vil-
lage Voice and New York Magazine.8 Newfield included New
York Supreme Court Judge Dominic S. Rinaldi among his list
80. Id., 500 N.E.2d at 796.
81. Id. at 735, 500 N.E.2d at 798.
82. See Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781
(9th Cir. 1980), discussed infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
83. 398 Mass. at 734, 500 N.E.2d at 797.
84. Id.
85. 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977).
86. Id. at 374, 366 N.E.2d at 1301, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 946. One reviewer wrote of
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL JUSTICE (1974), "So along comes mud-slinging Jack Newfield...
with a short collection of articles he wrote between 1970 and 1972 to expose corrupt
Brooklyn judges and the wretched conditions in New York prisons. They are... tales
that are reminiscent of the Nazi Auschwitz .... Jones, The Christian Science Moni-
tor, July 10, 1974, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
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of "worst judges."' 7
The New York Court of Appeals defined context as the ordi-
nary "context of the entire article."88 It found that the phrases
"probably corrupt" and "suspiciously lenient" were statements
of fact because the words were not used in a "'loose, figurative
sense' .... The ordinary and average reader would likely un-
derstand the use of these words, in the context of the entire
article, as meaning the plaintiff had committed illegal acts.
89
However, the court held that "[t]o state that a Judge is incom-
petent is to express an opinion regarding the Judge's perform-
ance in office."0
The Court of Appeals did not discuss a number of contextual
factors which might have influenced audience interpretation of
"probably corrupt" and "suspiciously lenient." Contextual fac-
tors that should have been considered included Newfield's rep-
utation as an investigative reporter who made no claims to
"objective" reporting; the title of the article, which clearly
signaled that the article was an evaluative piece of writing;
Newfield's traditional publication of his "ten worst judges" list;
and the first publication of the article in a publication known as
a forum for opinion pieces. Rather, the court held that there is
no constitutional protection if "the ordinary and average reader
would likely understand the use of these words.., as meaning
that plaintiff had committed illegal and unethical actions.""'
Thus, while the court noted the importance of context, it gave
greater weight to a content-based interpretation.
B. Federal Courts
1. The D.C. Circuit
The D.C. circuit took the context approach in Olman v. Ev-
ans. 2 The case involved a column written by nationally syndi-
cated Washington columnists Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak.93 In "The Marxist Professor's Intentions," the con-
servative columnists said that political science professor Bertell
87. Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 373, 366 N.E.2d at 1301, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
88. Id. at 382, 366 N.E.2d 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
89. Id. at 381-82, 366 N.E.2d at 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
90. Id at 381, 366 N.E.2d at 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950-51.
91. Id. at 382, 366 N.E.2d at 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
92. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL denied 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
93. Id. at 971.
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Olman was "an outspoken proponent of political Marxism.""
The column also included the following paragraph: "Such pam-
phleteering is hooted at by one political science professor in a
major eastern university, whose scholarship and reputation as a
liberal are well known. Olman has no status within the pro-
fession but is a pure and simple activist, he said."9 5
Judge Starr, writing for a plurality, relied on contextual cri-
teria to find opinion statements. 6 Judge Starr identified four
criteria for distinguishing fact from opinion based on the "total-
ity of the circumstances":
(1) The court should "analyze the common usage or meaning
of the specific language of the challenged statement itself."97
Does the statement have a precise core meaning for which a
consensus of understanding exists, or is it indefinite and
ambiguous?"
(2) The court must determine the "statement's verifiability
- is the statement capable of being objectively characterized as
true or false?""
(3) The court should examine the "full context of the state-
ment - the entire article or column.' 10 Judge Starr reasoned
that "unchallenged language surrounding the allegedly defam-
atory statement will influence the average reader's readiness to
infer that a particular statement has factual content."' 01
(4) The court should also examine the "broader context or
setting in which the statement appears. Different types of writ-
ing have... widely varying social conventions which signal to
the reader the likelihood of a statement's being either fact or
opinion. 11 2
Using these guidelines, the court held that the challenged
statement was opinion. The court placed great weight on the
nature of the article - a column written by two well-known
94. Id at 972.
95. I at 973 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 979-84; see also Note, Structuring Defamation Law to Eliminate the
Fact-Opinion Determination,: A Critique of Olman v. Evans, 71 IOWA L. REV. 913,926
(1986).








political columnists."3 Also, it appeared on the op-ed page of
the newspaper, "the well-recognized home of opinion and com-
ment." In addition, the court interpreted the "thrust of the col-
umn" and the language and factual information included in the
article, concluding that "[t]he charge of no status' in this con-
text would plainly appear to the average reader to be rhetorical
hyperbole.' "104
In dissent, Judge Wald used the same guidelines and found
the statement to be "more a statement of fact than of opin-
ion."105 While the plurality found that the context prepared
the reader for opinion statements, Judge Wald found oth-
erwise:
Indeed, the article as a whole, while it purports merely to raise
questions about Ollman's qualifications, promotes itself as a
call to sanity and objectivity and away from mere polemics.
Thus, the immediate context in which this statement was made
does little to warn a reader to regard with skepticism what
might otherwise appear to be an assertion of fact. l'6
Also dissenting, Judge Edwards "concluded that it is untena-
ble even to suggest that the statement... is an absolutely privi-
leged 'opinion'.... .I can find no meaningful case authority to
convince me that the First Amendment is designed to condone
such loose muckraking. ' 10 7 In the most widely publicized dis-
sent, Judge (now Justice) Scalia rejected the court's effort to
carve out greater constitutional protection for opinion as an un-
necessary exercise. Judge Scalia termed the "no status" state-
ment a "classic and coolly crafted libel." 10 8
The D.C. Circuit's disagreement over the fact/opinion
designation of "no status" illustrates the ineffectiveness of con-
textual guidelines, under which all of the conflicting opinions
are defendable. Unless context, such as placement on the edi-
torial page, is treated as a determinative factor, a position
Judge Starr rejected as being too extreme,109 then judges are
free to engage in ad hoc determinations.
103. Ii, at 990.
104. Id
105. Id. at 1032 (Wald, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1034.
107. IM at 1035-36 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. d at 987 n.33 (opinion of the court).
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2. The First Circuit
Before 1987, the First Circuit emphasized content over con-
text. In Avins v. White,110 the court made no reference to con-
text, instead relying solely on the nature of the language. In
Avins, a former dean of Delaware Law School filed a libel ac-
tion based on the following statements contained in an accredi-
tation report: "The most important deficiency is an intangible
one; there is an academic ennui that pervades the institution.
The intellectual spark is missing in the faculty and the stu-
dents."' The court stated that" 'academic ennui' or the lack of
'intellectual spark' connotes to us no more than a subjective
opinion of the educational atmosphere pervading" the law
school."
Similar statements made in casual conversation or an infor-
mal letter would be statements of opinion, but does the context
of the statements - a formal report recommending denial of
accreditation - change the interpretation? The court did not
address this question.
In a more recent case, McCabe v. Rattiner,"3 the First Circuit
adopted a "totality of circumstances" standard based on previ-
ous attempts to establish contextual guidelines. The court
looked at three factors: (1) the statement itself; (2) the article
as a whole; and, (3) the article's "social context.""' 4
At issue in McCabe was the word "scam" used as a "carryover
headline" on the second page of a Block Island (Rhode Island)
Times story about a timeshare condominium development.
The story was a first person narrative of publisher Dan Rat-
tiner's dealings with a salesperson for the plaintiff's develop-
ment. The salesperson promised a lobster dinner if Rattiner
toured a sample unit, but did not deliver. The story left the
clear impression that Rattiner was not impressed by the units
or the sales technique.1
5
The court held that "scam does not have a precise meaning
... [and that] there is not a single usage in common phraseol-
ogy. [This] lack of precision makes the assertion X is a 'scam'
110. 627 F.2d. 637 (1st Cir. 1980).
111. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
112. 1& at 643.
113. 814 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1987).
114. Id at 842.
115. I& at 840-41.
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incapable of being proven true or false."'116
Rattiner's first person account "reinforced" the court's con-
clusion that "scam" was an opinion statement in this context,
noting that "[t]he style of writing put the reader on notice that
the author [was] giving his views. While opinion pieces may
contain defamatory statements, these pieces are unlikely to
convey the impression that an imprecise and unverifiable state-
ment is meant to be a statement of fact.""' 7 The court sug-
gested that Rattiner's article, in essence, asked the question:
"Is it a scam to promise a lobster dinner and then only give it
after protest? Is it a scam to gross approximately $9 million
from a 25 unit resort?" 118
Furthermore, there had been some debate on Block Island
over condominium development." 9 The court found that the
use of "scam" in a first person narrative within the "context of
public debate over a matter of community concern" was pro-
tected opinion.12'
3. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit acknowledged the importance of contex-
tual factors in Buckley v. Littel,'2 1 but nevertheless took a con-
tent-oriented approach in that case 2 2 and three others2 3 over
the next nine years, until Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A. 124 In
Buckley, William F. Buckley brought suit against the author of
Wild Tongues for, among other things, calling Buckley a "fel-
low traveler to the communists or fascists.' 2 5 The author
wrote that "[l]ike Westbrook Pegler, who lied day after day...
Buckley could be taken to court" for his lies.126
The court extended its consideration of context beyond labor
116. Id. at 842.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 843.
120. Id.
121. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
122. Id. at 895-96.
123. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom
Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y,
556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub. nora. Edwards v. New York Times Co., 434 U.S.
1002 (1977); Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). See
ififra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
124. 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985). See infra notes 15056 and accompanying text.
125. 539 F.2d at 884-85, n.1.
126. Id.
1988]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
disputes to include the "contest [sic] of political, social, or philo-
sophical debate."'1 It also examined the nature of the publica-
tion - the book was, the court said, a "polemical tract. ' 12' The
court also considered the "imprecision" of the language. 1'
Based on these criteria, the court found that "fellow traveler"
and "fascist" were statements of opinion because of the
"tremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage of
these terms,"' ° but that the assertion that Buckley was a liar
was a "factual assertion relating to Buckley's journalistic
integrity.' 3'1
The Second Circuit continued the codtent-oriented approach
in Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche,132 by focusing on the verifiability
of an author's language.1as In the book Hemingway in Spain,
the author described A.E. Hotchner, a friend of Ernest Hem-
ingway, as a "toady," a "hypocrite" who exhibited "two-faced
behavior" toward Hemingway's true friends and "put up a
very good front as [Hemingway's] mild-mannered, obedient ser-
vant," and an "exploiter of [Hemingway's] reputation" who was
"never open and above board.""' In addition, the author wrote
that Hemingway said, "I don't really trust [A.E. Hotchner].' 35
The court stated that these statements could not constitute li-
bel "if viewed in isolation."'1
In Edwards v. National Audubon Society,13 7 the court contin-
ued to favor content over context. Contrary to Buckley, the
term "liar" was held to be an opinion.' A letter to the editor
concerning the use of the Audubon Society's statistical infor-
mation said, in part, "[n]or do we like to call people liars, but
those who have most consistently misused our data.' 139
127. Id. at 895.
128. Id. at 894.
129. Id, at 893-94.
130. Id, at 893.
131. Id. at 895-96.
132. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub. nom Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co.,
434 U.S. 834 (1977).
133. Id, at 913. The court held that "[a]n assertion that cannot be proved false
cannot be held libelous." Id,
134. Id. at 912.
135. Id.
136. Id, at 913. However, the court held that while the language was not verifiable,
it implied the existence of unstated defamatory facts; therefore, "the expression of
opinion becomes as damaging as an assertion of fact." Id.
137. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub. nom. 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
138. See upra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
139. 556 F.2d at 119.
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The Second Circuit distinguished "liar" from "paid liar": To
call someone a liar "in this context.., merely expressed the
opinion that anyone who persisted in misusing Audubon statis-
tics after being forewarned could not be intellectually hon-
est;"'" however, to state that the plaintiff was a "paid liar"
requires a factual basis. 4 '
This distinction is based in part on the verifiability of the
charge. The fact that the plaintiff had been paid could be estab-
lished, but the charge that he lied would be harder to prove or
disprove.'4
In Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.,' 43 the Second Circuit
again failed to focus its analysis on context. A report in New
Times magazine accused Buddy Cianci, the controversial mayor
of Providence, Rhode Island, of paying off a woman who
threatened to bring rape charges against him.'" The court
noted that language must be "considered in the context of the
entire article and the words taken as they are commonly under-
stood." 14' Notwithstanding this language, the Second Circuit
focused on the nature of the language in deciding the case:
[W]hen an "opinion" is something more than a generally de-
rogatory remark but is laden with factual conten such as
charging the commission of serious crimes, the First Amend-
ment confers no absolute immunity.1
The court did not consider important conceptual factors such
as the nature of the publication, the writing style of the author,
or the controversy surrounding the publication. A section of
the article's final page demonstrates how important such fac-
tors are:
If, as it was once claimed, the entire matter was merely a
shakedown, it was definitely of the nickel and dime variety:
For the nominal sum of $3,000, Cianci had managed to buy his
way out of a possible felony charge.... And so, we'd like to ask
once and for all, and on the record: Mayor Cianci, what did
transpire on that morning of March 2, 1966? It is a question
that should be answered, and certainly before the night of No-
140. Id. at 121.
141. Id. at 121 n.5.
142. Id,
143. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 55-56.
145. Id at 60.
146. Id at 63 (emphasis added).
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vember 7, 1978.17
While questions can be raised about the journalistic ethics of
such a charge, the Cianci court's assertion that the language is
too "laden with factual content 14 to be opinion ignores the ef-
fect of context on reader interpretation. As the above text indi-
cates, the style and tone of the article, as well as the magazine
in which the article appeared,149 support a finding that the lan-
guage was too opinion-laden to be factual.
Finally, the Second Circuit fashioned a hybrid fact/opinion
test in Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A.,1° which specifically
involved contextual factors. The case involved a restaurant re-
view which included statements such as "the sweet and sour
pork contain more dough ... than meat," "the green peppers
.. remained still frozen on the plate," "the rice [was] soaking
in oil," and "the Peking lacquered Duck... was made up of
only one dish (instead of the three traditional ones).''
The Second Circuit's fact/opinion test contained four factors:
(1) the context in which the statements were made and the
surrounding circumstances; (2) whether language is used in a
precise, literal manner or is loose, figurative, or hyperbolic; (3)
whether the statements are objectively capable of being proven
true or false; and (4) whether an opinion statement implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts. 52
The court found that all the statements were opinion, except
the one concerning the serving of Peking Duck. 5 ' The ques-
tion of whether Peking Duck contained one or three dishes was
a verifiable fact.154 For the other challenged statements, how-
ever, the context of the article - a restaurant review - was an
important factor: "Restaurant reviews are also the well recog-
nized home of opinion and comment.... The natural function
of the review is to convey the critic's opinion of the restaurant
reviewed.' 5 5 Within the context of a restaurant review, the
court interpreted statements such as "frozen on the plate" and
147. Waters, Buddy, We Hardly Knew Ya, NEW TIMES, July 24, 1978, at 23, 29.
148. 639 F.2d at 63.
149. New Times was an alternative news magazine with a clearly stated political
point of view.
150. 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
151. Id. at 221, 222.
152. Id. at 226; see also Kelly v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1986).
153. 759 F.2d at 226-27.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 227.
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"more dough than meat" as "metaphors, exaggeration and hy-
perbole."'" Thus, the Second Circuit evolved from Buckley's
content-based test to a more satisfying (yet still uncertain) se-
ries of contextual guidelines.
4. The Eighth Circuit
In 1984, the Eighth Circuit tended toward the content ap-
proach in Lauderback v. ABC,157 a case involving a 20/20 televi-
sion news magazine report on fraudulent insurance sales.'-"
The court's analysis illustrates the uncertainty of focusing on
the text without reference to contextual factors when distin-
guishing fact from opinion.
In the broadcast, insurance agent Garo Lauderback's picture
appeared on the screen following a picture of a newspaper
headline which read, "Emmet Grand Jury Indicts Two Iowa In-
surance Agents. '159 While his picture was on the screen, a
voice-over said, "So it's the other guys who are doing the steal-
ing."" Then a portion of a taped interview with Lauderback
ran, in which he said that a nursing home director had verified
that the policy he sold would in fact cover nursing home care.
An interview followed in which the nursing home director de-
nied talking to Lauderback. At the end of the segment, the an-
nouncer said, "Mr. Lauderback is currently under a formal
investigation." 161
The Lauderback segment of the 20/20 report was surrounded
by segments concerning criminal prosecution of other insur-
ance agents in which the agents were called "liars," and
"crooks," and their practices were termed "rotten," "unethi-
cal," and "sometimes illegal."' 2 The Eighth Circuit found that
the broadcast merely contained ABC's opinion of Lauderback's
dealings and was not a bald accusation of criminal activity:163
While allegations of specific criminal conduct generally cannot
be protected as opinion, broad brush-stroked references to un-
ethical conduct, even using terms normally understood to im-
pute specific criminal acts, may be understood by the
156. I& at 229.
157. 741 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1984).
158. Id. at 194.




163. Id. at 19T.
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reasonable viewer as opinion.... We conclude that a reason-
able viewer of the 20/20 broadcast would have recognized that
inferences raised about Lauderback's honesty or about the
truthfulness of his statements were opinions and not legal con-
clusions.... [T]he broadcast as a whole may have indicated
that ABC believed Lauderback to be guilty of unethical behav-
ior. However, any such representation was understandable as
opinion and not fact.'"
The court cited Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National As-
sociation of Letter Carriers v. Austin 16 and Greenbelt Coopera-
tive Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler'66 to support its
content-oriented approach. However, the court failed to note
that the context of a television news magazine show is different
from a labor or political dispute. It seems unreasonable to as-
sume that the average viewer watching a news magazine report
on insurance fraud will dismiss allegations of illegal and uneth-
ical behavior as opinion, especially when the segment is sur-
rounded by assertions of criminal activity by other agents.
In Janklow v. Newsweek, 6 1 the Eighth Circuit essentially
followed the approach of the D.C. Circuit in Ollman v. Ev-
ans.'68 Originally, a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the
statement was factual and thus defamatory.169 On rehearing by
the full court, the Eighth Circuit reversed itself and held that
the statement was opinion and thus protected under the first
amendment. 70
In Janklow, the former governor of South Dakota sued News-
week for a report on Janklow's stormy dealings with native
American activist Dennis Banks while Janklow was state attor-
ney general.17 ' The story contained the following statements:
Along the way, Banks made a dangerous enemy - William
Janklow. Their feud started in 1974, when Banks brought
charges against Janklow in a tribal court for assault .... Eight
months later Janklow, who had won his election despite the
messy publicity - was prosecuting Banks. And his case...
164. Id. at 197-98.
165. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
166. 398 U.S. 6 (1970). See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
167. 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), modifying 759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 107 S.Ct. 272 (1986).
168. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). See supra
notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
169. 759 F.2d 644.
170. 788 F.2d 1300.




Janklow claimed that the article implied that he prosecuted
Banks to get revenge. 73 The fact/opinion question centered on
the interpretation of the phrase, "was prosecuting Banks.' '1 74
In the original opinion, the Eighth Circuit panel looked at
four factors: (1) the language used in the article; (2) the forum
in which the statement is made; (3) the precision of the lan-
guage; and (4) the use of cautionary language. 75
The panel found that: (1) the language "leaves the impres-
sion that it is intended to be factual in nature;" '76 (2) the Na-
tional Affairs section of Newsweek is a forum in which readers
expect to find statements of fact;177 (3) the meaning to which
the article is susceptible - that Janklow prosecuted Banks for
revenge - is not "broad, unfocused or subjective;"'7 8 and (4)
the article did not contain "cautionary language."' 79 Accord-
ingly, the panel concluded the statement was an assertion of
fact, not an expression of opinion."*
On rehearing by the full court, a majority of the Eighth Cir-
cuit reached an entirely different conclusion while using a test
containing essentially the same factors.' 8 The majority's fact/
opinion criteria included: (1) the precision and specificity of the
disputed statement; (2) the verifiability of the statement; (3)
the literary context in which the statement was made; and (4)
the "public context."' 2
Under these guidelines, the court found that the phrase was
not precise; rather, the imputation of improper motive had to
be implied.Is The statement was also unverifiable, as it was
subject to other interpretations.' 8 Furthermore, not being on
an editorial page was not a decisive factor.'5 Rather, the court
172. Id. at 1303.
173. Id.
174. 1d
175. 759 F.2d at 651-52.
176. Id. at 651.
177. Id at 651-52.
178. Id at 652.
179. Id
180. Id
181. 788 F.2d at 1302-03.
182. Id.
183. Id at 1303-04.
184. Id at 1304.
185. Id.
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noted that news magazines are known for "feisty language,"'' M
and readers "expect a fair amount of opinion"187 and "spirited
writing."'T ' Finally, looking at the public context the court said,
"criticism of the conduct of a state attorney general who now
serves as governor involves a matter of national importance,
the treatment of Indian people."' 89 Therefore, the challenged
statement was protected opinion because the disputed state-
ment in this case is imprecise, unverifiable, presented in a fo-
rum where spirited writing is expected and involves criticism of
the motives and intentions of a public official.'90
The contradictory conclusions reached by the Eighth Circuit
panel and the full court bring into sharp focus the conclusory
nature of the tests developed to distinguish fact from opinion.
In reading the two opinions, it is difficult to believe that the
two courts looked at the same text.
5. The Ninth Circuit
In Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer
Corp.,1 91 the Ninth Circuit formulated a fact/opinion test
which requires that the court examine the statement in its to-
tality, in context.1 92 The following guidelines were developed:
(1) the court must consider "all the words used, not merely a
particular phrase or sentence;" (2) it must give weight to cau-
tionary terms or "terms of apparency" that accompany the
statement; and (3) it must consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement, including the medium by which the
statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is
published.193
In finding that the statements involved were opinion, the
court placed strong emphasis on the context of the charge -
the statements appeared in defendant's news release; the re-
lease was "cautiously prefaced as representing the opinion of
186. Id.
187. Id
188. Id. at 1305.
189. Id. at 1304-05. The court's discussion of the political context suggests that its
view of public context was central to its analysis. Because the speech criticized a gov-
eminent official, the court found that it was "at the heart of the First Amendment."
Id at 1304.
190. Id at 1305.
191. 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).




Genesis' management;"' 94 the release was published in a trade
publication whose audience "would be expected to be aware of
the nature of the litigation between the parties and the re-
sponses that might be evoked;"'195 and it was made "in the early
weeks of a commercial litigation which promised to be hard
fought."' ' Because the statements at issue were made in this
context, the court said, "language which generally might be
considered as statements of fact may well assume the character
of statements of opinion."'197
Thus, Information Control represents an effort to move
away from a content based approach toward a method of analy-
sis which focuses on the effect of context on audience interpre-
tation of language.
6. The Eleventh Circuit
In Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,' 98 the Eleventh
Circuit placed greater emphasis on contextual criteria than any
other circuit. In Keller, a cartoon showed gangsters carrying
moneybags inside a dilapidated building identified as the
"Krest View Nursing Home" with the caption, "Don't Worry,
Boss. We Can Always Reopen It As A Haunted House For The
Kiddies."'1 The court, considered the medium of expression a
contextual criterion, placed cartoons in a category of protected
opinion:
If a court must consider the circumstances giving rise to the
publication of a statement to determine how the statement
must have been understood, then certainly it must take note of
the medium through which the statement is expressed ....
One cannot reasonably interpret a cartoon as literally depict-
ing an actual event or situation.2°
The Eleventh Circuit's use of the medium of expression as a
contextual criterion approaches the creation of determinative




197. Id (quoting Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 552 P.2d
425, 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1976)).
198. 778 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1985).
199. Id. at 713.
200. I& at 716. The court distinguished the caricature from the caption. It used the
Information Control standards adopted by the Florida courts to find that the captions
also constituted protected opinion. Id. at 716-18.
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statement. Absent such categories, however, the use of contex-
tual criteria to interpret text is only marginally more consistent
than either the content approach or current judicial
guidelines. 01
Conclusion
The fact/opinion tests developed over the past decade, espe-
cially the most recent efforts at developing comprehensive
tests, are little more than conclusive devices. Judicial apprecia-
tion of a fine turn of phrase or a well-crafted sentence is too
fragile a thread for protection of freedom of the press. If we are
to take seriously Justice Powell's assertion that "there is no
such thing as a false idea,"202 then the fact/opinion distinction
must be redefined.0 3
When communication is viewed as a transactional process -
with audience interpretation rather than message content
shaping the meaning of texts - then context becomes a deter-
minative factor in distinguishing fact from opinion. The first
amendment demands the creation of clearly defined contextual
conditions in which all ambiguous statements are, as a matter
of law, statements of opinion.
Adoption of contextual categories of protected forums for
opinion would resolve the uncertainty of the fact/opinion dis-
tinction. If as a matter of law, a statement is susceptible to in-
terpretation as either a fact or an opinion, the context would be
determinative. All ambiguous language presented in forums
where audiences generally expect opinion statements, such as
editorials, op-ed pages, opinion columns, editorial advertise-
ments and cartoons, would be considered opinion as a matter of
law. In all other forums, the opinion defense would not be
201. Where the Keller court found it unreasonable to interpret a cartoon as con-
taining statements of fact, a Missouri Court of Appeals found actionable a cartoon
that portrayed a psychic as a "bizarrely dressed figure" sitting in a bed surrounded by
an "incomprehensible array of charts and diagrams." Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing
Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 478-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). The court addressed the allegations
that "[the psychic did] not dress or behave in the manner depicted in the drawing" by
noting that "the facts set out visually in the drawing go beyond the protection af-
forded opinion." Id at 479.
202. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
203. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 869. Developments in other areas of libel law
have prompted calls for the abandonment of the fact/opinion distinction. Since the
Constitution requires both proof of falsehood and the fault standard, see Gertz, 418
U.S. at 339, perhaps the fact/opinion distinction and the fair comment defense are
redundant and unnecessary. See, e.g., Note, supra note 96, at 926.
[Vol. 10:763
1988] FACT/OPINION DISTINCTION 793
available where the text is ambiguous, but the plaintiff would
still bear the burden of proving the falsity of the statement.

